Does wealth increase parental investment biases in child education ?

evidence from two African populations on the cusp of the fertility transition. by Gibson, M.A. & Sear, R.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
06 December 2010
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Gibson, M.A. and Sear, R. (2010) ’Does wealth increase parental investment biases in child education ?
evidence from two African populations on the cusp of the fertility transition.’, Current anthropology., 51 (5).
pp. 693-701.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/655954
Publisher’s copyright statement:
2010 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
Does wealth increase parental investment biases in child 
education? Evidence from two African populations on the cusp of 
the fertility transition
1
 
 
Mhairi A. Gibsona* and Rebecca Searb 
 
a Department of Archaeology and Anthropology 
University of Bristol 
43 Woodland Road 
Bristol BS8 1UU  
United Kingdom 
 
b Department of Social Policy 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Word count: 5086 (including references, excl abstract). 
No. of figures: 3 
No. of tables: 4 
 
Key Words: evolutionary anthropology, parental investment, education, Africa 
 
*Correspondence to:  
Mhairi A. Gibson, Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of Bristol, 43 
Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UU, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0) 117 954 6087, Fax: +44 
(0) 117 954 6001, E-mail: Mhairi.Gibson@bristol.ac.uk 
 
                                                 
1
 Acknowledgements: We acknowledge with grateful thanks the financial support provided 
by The Leverhulme Trust (MG) and The Wellcome Trust; The Simon Population Trust, 
Parkes Foundation and Boise Foundation (RS). In Ethiopia, we owe a debt of thanks to 
Eshetu Gurmu, Ruth Mace and The Oromiya Regional Government who have facilitated this 
research, as well as the people of Hitosa and Dodota woredas who generously donated their 
time to this study. In Malawi, similar thanks are extended to Ruth Mace for facilitating the 
project, the team of fieldworkers who collected the data, and the people of Kasankha and 
Msaka who participated in this study. We also thank David Lawson, Andy Wells and other 
members of LSE‘s evolutionary Work in Progress group for helpful comments. 
 2 
ABSTRACT 
Why fertility declines is still a matter of intense debate. One theory proposes that fertility 
decline may be partly driven by shifts in parental investment strategies: couples reduce 
family sizes as demographic and economic changes cause investment in quality of children to 
become more important than investment in quantity of children. A key driver for this change 
is a shift from subsistence-based to skills-based economies, in which education enhances 
child quality. Evolutionary anthropologists have modified this theory to propose that parental 
investment will diverge during the demographic transition according to resource availability: 
couples with greatest access to resources will invest more in quality than quantity of children. 
Here we test the impact of resources on educational investment in two populations on the 
cusp of fertility decline: the patrilineal Arsi Oromo of Ethiopia and the matrilineal Chewa of 
Malawi. In both populations increased wealth is associated with greater biases in the 
allocation of education between children. In richer families, early born children are 
prioritized over later born, though early born sons are favored in the patrilineal population, 
early born daughters in the matrilineal population. Poorer families invest less in their 
children‘s education, but also discriminate less between children.  
  
Word count= 197 
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INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic decline in fertility associated with modernization and increasing availability of 
resources is still something of a conundrum (Bulatao & Casterline 2001, Caldwell et al. 
2006). It seems to make little intuitive sense that as societies become healthier and wealthier 
individuals should restrict the number of children born to a far greater extent than those in 
less healthy and poorer societies. This is a particular problem for evolutionary 
anthropologists, for whom reproductive decisions should maximize reproductive fitness 
(number of surviving offspring, and grand offspring: Borgerhoff Mulder 1998). One 
influential theory which has been proposed to explain this fertility transition is a shift in 
parental investment strategies (proposed by economists, e.g. Becker 1991, and subsequently 
modified by evolutionary anthropologists, e.g. Kaplan 1996, Kaplan et al. 2002). As mortality 
declines, and as the economic costs and benefits of children change, investment in the quality 
of children provides a greater economic return than investment in the quantity of children. In 
high mortality, subsistence economies, producing many children is necessary in order to 
ensure that at least some survive. Children are also able to offset some of the costs of raising 
them by contributing subsistence and domestic labor (Kramer 2005, Lee and Kramer 2002). 
Mortality decline, reducing the need for ‗insurance‘ births, tends to coincide with a shift to 
skills-based market economy where investment in the quality of children becomes important 
to ensure children are more competitive in the new environment (Kaplan 1996, Kaplan et al. 
2002). Educational investment is critical in this new skills-based economy. This investment is 
costly, however, both intrinsically and because education takes children away from the 
household and reduces the ability of children to contribute to household labor. It has the 
potential to yield increasing payoffs to investment, but its costly nature requires parents to be 
more discriminative (Kaplan 1996, Kaplan et al. 2002). Couples therefore begin to limit 
births but invest more in each child. Such behavior may not maximize fitness at all, but is 
driven by evolved tendencies to allocate parental investment in ways which produce the most 
competitive offspring (Kaplan 1996, Mace 2007, but see Mace 1998, McNamara and 
Houston 2006 for theoretical evidence that such behavior might ultimately enhance fitness in 
the long term).  
 
This model predicts that wealthier families will begin to shift towards a child quality, and 
away from a child quantity, strategy before poorer families (Kaplan 1996, Kaplan et al. 
2002). Mortality will be lower in wealthier families, reducing the risks of concentrating 
investment in a small number of children, and such families will be able to bear the costs of 
educating children more easily than poorer families. Such families may also be able to ‗add 
value‘ to their children‘s education, by being better able to capitalize on educational 
opportunities (for example, traveling to job opportunities which may result from education). 
Evidence suggests that wealthy families were indeed the leaders of the fertility transition (e.g. 
Clark & Cummins 2009, Woods 1984). To fit this model, biased allocation of parental 
investment should therefore be more evident among the richer sections of the community, 
with less parental discrimination among the less wealthy (Gibson and Lawson, submitted, 
Lawson and Mace, in press).  
 
Here we test this model by investigating parental investment in child education in two 
societies on the cusp of fertility decline: rural Ethiopia and rural Malawi. In both cases, 
fertility is still high and mortality relatively high (though declining). Educational levels are 
also still relatively low in both populations, though increasing. Both populations are still 
largely subsistence economies, though integration into a market based economy is beginning. 
We test whether biased allocation of parental investment in education is seen in these 
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populations, and how it is affected by resource availability: does wealth increase parental 
discrimination between offspring?  
 
We test for biased parental investment by determining whether sibling configuration – the 
composite of number of siblings, their sex and birth order - affects the amount of education a 
child receives. Sibling configuration is more useful than overall number of siblings for 
exploring parental investment biases in such pre-transitional populations, because differences 
in wealth between groups may be confounded with family size (Gibson and Lawson, 
submitted). Here we are measuring the outcome of investment – amount of education 
received – rather than parental investment itself, but this is a common strategy in this 
literature given that investment itself is hard to measure. Previous research has found that 
aspects of sibling configuration are frequently associated with differential parental 
investment, as measured by child outcomes. For example, among Western populations there 
is a negative relationship between a child‘s order of birth and height (Lawson and Mace 
2008), education and IQ (Bjerkedal et al. 2007, Boomsma et al. 2008, Steelman et al. 2002), 
income generation (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005) and survival (Modin 2002). Social 
scientists make the general assumption that more siblings simply dilute a child‘s allocation of 
parental resources: the ―resource dilution effect‖ (Blake 1989). Evolutionary explanations 
provide a more nuanced interpretation suggesting that firstborns receive more investment 
because they have higher reproductive value: within a family, older, compared to younger, 
children are more likely to survive to adulthood having already survived the most risky 
period of early infancy. They are also closer in age to starting reproduction, thereby 
shortening generation time. Jeon (2008) provides a mathematical model of parents allocate 
resources among multiple dependent children, which supports the hypothesis that older 
children will usually be favored over younger; though it is worth noting that this model 
concerns the allocation of parental resources at a given point in time, rather than the 
sequential decisions likely to characterize parental investment in education for different aged 
children.  
 
However results are not always consistent with the resource dilution model, most notably 
among non-Western populations where higher birth order is associated with improvements in 
child well-being e.g. intrauterine growth (Ghosh and Bandyopadhyay 2006) early child 
survival (Magadi, Madise, and Diamond 2001) and fertility (Draper and Hames 2000). A 
number of alternative explanatory models have explored the possibility that investment in 
children may not simply decline with increasing birth order. Some emphasize the cooperative 
breeding strategy of our species, and the potential for older children to contribute to 
investment in their younger siblings through labor-force participation or helping with 
childcare or extended networks of kin (e.g. Caldwell 1976, Sear et al. 2002; Eloundou-
Enyegue & Williams 2006), while others underline the importance of increasing parental 
experience in determining child well-being (Hertwig, Davis, and Sulloway 2002). The 
―terminal investment hypothesis‖ emphasizes the increasing value of each offspring relative 
to its parent‘s residual reproductive value with increasing parental age (Clutton-Brock 1984). 
It predicts that parents coming to the end of their own reproductive lives should increase 
investment in later born offspring, because they represent the last opportunity to invest in 
direct offspring. Incorporating both terminal investment and resource dilution effects, some 
models predict a non-linear relationship between birth order and parental investment 
outcomes. First and last born offspring benefit from periods of exclusive parental investment, 
with middle-born offspring being at a disadvantage (Faurie et al. 2009, Hertwig, Davis, and 
Sulloway 2002, Salmon and Daly 1998, Sulloway 1998). 
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Parents may also bias investment by sex of child, reflecting the relative costs and benefits of 
each sex. Some evidence indicates that sons, as the more expensive sex to rear, reduce 
investment in all later born offspring measured by reductions in birth weight (Nielsen et al. 
2008), adult height (Rickard 2008) and reproductive success (Rickard, Russell, and Lummaa 
2007, Sear, Mace, and McGregor 2003). Sons may receive more investment from parents 
because they can benefit more, in terms of reproductive success, from parental resources than 
daughters can. This may explain why the majority of human societies which hold inelastic 
heritable resources (e.g. limited land and cattle) practice patriliny, or male-biased wealth 
inheritance. Competition between brothers is particularly evident in such societies, where 
males with many brothers have been found to have higher risks of dying in childhood 
(Voland and Dunbar 1995), as well as lower education levels, less inheritance, fewer 
marriage opportunities (Beise and Voland 2008, Borgerhoff Mulder 1998) and lower 
reproductive success (Low 1991, Mace 1996).  
 
Parental biases in investment between daughters, in general, appear to be less pronounced. A 
few studies have provided evidence for same-sex competition between sisters, for example, 
older sisters are associated with poorer growth among females in Ethiopia (Clegg and 
Pawson 1978) and lower educational attainment in the US (Butcher and Case 1994). But in 
many pre-transitional populations, older sisters may actually offset costs of large families by 
helping with childcare (Quinlan and Flinn 2005, Sear et al. 2002) and, in bridewealth 
societies, by improving their brothers‘ marriage opportunities (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998). 
However, few studies have been undertaken under conditions of matriliny. Societies are 
matrilineal where daughters benefit more from inherited resources than sons, and in such 
societies girls are likely to be in greater competition with elder sisters for resources, including 
inherited wealth (e.g. Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003, Sear 2008).  
 
Here, we test for effects of sex, birth order and sibling configuration in two culturally distinct 
populations, a patrilineal agro-pastoralist society in Ethiopia and matrilineal horticulturalists 
in Malawi. We test the following in each population: 
a) Does sibling configuration (number of elder or younger, same-sex or opposite sex siblings) 
influence education outcomes?  
b) Does investment vary according to household resource availability? 
 
We predict that the influence of sibling configuration may differ in the two populations 
(specifically, sons are more likely to be favored in the patrilineal population, daughters in the 
matrilineal), but that the influence of household resource availability on parental 
discrimination between children will be the same in both populations. 
 
STUDY SITES  
Ethiopia 
The Arsi Oromo are agropastoralists, combining cattle rearing with maize, wheat, sorghum 
and teff farming in the low-lying areas of Arsi region, in Southern Ethiopia. Once described 
as the ―bread basket of Ethiopia‖ in recent years the region has experienced irregular rainfall 
and poor agricultural productivity. High population growth and a shortage of land have 
resulted in increasing competition for resources both within and between households (Gibson 
2008, Gibson and Mace 2006). Fertility and mortality are still high in this population; while 
childhood and adult undernutrition are prevalent (see Table 1). Inheritance patterns are 
patrilineal and post-marital residence is predominantly patrilocal. There is a strong cultural 
preference expressed for sons and for other members of the patrilineage. Polygyny is present 
in just under 30% of households. Herd size is considered to be the best measure of wealth in 
 6 
this population. Demographic, socio-economic, and education data used in this study were 
collected from 240 households during a household survey undertaken by MG in 2003-4 in 4 
villages.  
 
Malawi 
The Chewa are largely horticulturalists, growing maize, though a small proportion are also 
involved in income-generating activities such as wage labor or trade (91% of this sample 
consider their main subsistence activity to be farming; about 30% in total engage in other 
activities). They occupy the Central and Southern regions of Malawi, and are similarly 
experiencing high population growth and a shortage of land. Fertility and mortality are also 
still high in this population, though slightly lower than in Ethiopia (Table 1). Inheritance 
patterns are predominantly matrilineal and post-marital residence matrilocal, though there is 
some evidence that inheritance patterns may be changing towards a relatively flexible 
strategy. Land ownership mainly resides with women, and passes from mother to daughter, 
but in a small fraction of households in the dataset used here (20%) men owned this 
household resource (Sear 2008). These households tended to be wealthier than those in which 
women owned land. Wealth is measured using a combination of garden size and whether the 
household is involved in any income generating activities. Almost all marriages are 
monogamous. Data used here were collected during a household survey undertaken by RS in 
1997 in 2 villages in the Southern region.  
 
METHODS 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for education and background socio-demographic 
characteristics for the study populations. The outcome variable measuring level of education 
varied between models. In the Ethiopian sample, overall levels of education were low, only 
34% had received any education and less than 15% of school-aged children had spent more 
than a year in school, as such the outcome variable became a simple dichotomous variable 
indicating any level of education (0=no education, 1=any education). Only children of school 
age (7-17 years old) were included in the analyses to control for secular changes in education 
(n=400). In polygynous households, only the first wife‘s offspring were included, to control 
for known effects of lower investment in junior wives offspring (Gibson and Mace, 2007). In 
the Malawian sample, 73% of children were in education, so the dependent variable 
measured was the total number of years in education (at the survey date). This sample 
included 1792 Chewa children from 702 households; here school age is defined as 6-19 years 
of age. Logistic regression was used to determine the effects of siblings on educational 
attainment in Ethiopia; linear regression was used for the Malawian analyses described 
below. 
 
To test for sib effects in educational investment within households, we first determined the 
relationship between overall birth order and educational attainment for each population, 
controlling for family size (total number of siblings). Model 1 analyses the relationship 
between education and a quadratic function of birth order, in order to pick up any non-linear 
effects of birth order. For each population, we first ran this model on all children, including 
co-variates for sex and wealth. Then, to explore the effects of sex and wealth on the 
relationship between birth order and education, we divided the sample by sex and wealth and 
ran the model separately for boys and girls, and for rich and poor households. In both cases, 
‗poor‘ households include approximately the bottom half of the wealth distribution, ‗rich‘ 
household approximately the top half (in Ethiopia ‗poor‘ equates to households with less than 
3 cattle, ‗rich‘ as those with greater than or equal to 4 cattle; in Malawi ‗poor‘ indicates 
households with 2 or fewer hectares of land, ‗rich‘ as those with more than 2 hectares, or 
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involved in income-generating activities). All models control for child‘s age and age squared, 
mother‘s age and family size. 
 
Overall birth order may be confounded by the sex of siblings, however. So we then 
investigated the effects of sibling configuration on educational investment. In Model 2 we 
tested the effects of number of older brothers, number of younger brothers, number of older 
sisters and number of younger sisters on our education outcomes. Again, we first ran the 
model on all children, including variables for sex and wealth, then divided the sample by sex 
and wealth and ran the model separately for girls and boys and rich and poor households. All 
models control for child‘s age (as a quadratic function) and mother‘s age. 
 
RESULTS 
Ethiopia 
The results of the logistic regression analysis on the probability of school attendance shown 
in Table 2 suggests that female children were disadvantaged, with girls being significantly 
less likely to receive education for their age than boys. For all children there is a linear 
reduction in the likelihood of receiving education with increasing birth order, which is more 
evident among male offspring. These birth order effects appear to be driven by discriminative 
parental investment in the richest households, since birth order effects are absent in poor 
households. Model 2 (presented in Table 3, and illustrated in Figure 1) identifies more 
specifically that earlier born sons are prioritized in educational investment at the expense of 
later born sons in rich households. Number of elder brothers is negatively associated with the 
probability of a male child receiving education. This pattern of unequal investment among 
male siblings is not found between female siblings. There is some suggestion that younger 
brothers may be beneficial, since in rich households younger brothers have a positive impact 
on educational attainment, particularly for girls. 
 
Malawi  
The results of the linear regression analysis on the total number of years of education shown 
in Table 2 suggests that again female children were disadvantaged, with girls having 
significantly fewer years of education than boys. Birth order also affects the amount of 
education received, though here this relationship appears to be quadratic, suggesting an early- 
and a late-born advantage in education. As in Ethiopia, however, these effects appear to be 
driven by biased parental investment in rich households: they are seen for both sexes in rich 
households, but for neither sex in poor households. When included in the same model as birth 
order, family size has a positive relationship with education, perhaps capturing an 
unmeasured effect of wealth (when included in preliminary models without birth order, 
family size has the predicted negative effect on education: results not shown). This effect also 
seems to be driven by rich households. A similar trend for a positive effect of family size is 
observed in the Ethiopian dataset, but in this case only among females.   
 
When investigating sibling configuration in more detail, birth order effects in Malawi seem to 
be largely driven by a biased investment in older daughters, in that having older sisters has a 
negative effect on the amount of education received (Tables 4). But again these effects are 
more substantial in richer households. In poor households, boys suffer from the presence of 
elder sisters, but no other kind of sibling has any affect on boys or girls. In rich households, 
elder siblings of either sex are favored over younger (illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b). As in 
Ethiopia, there appears to be a beneficial effect of younger brothers, this time for both sexes.  
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Finally, it is worth noting that there is overall a positive effect of wealth on education in both 
populations. For traditional forms of wealth this effect is either rather weak (for herd size in 
Ethiopia) or non-existent (for garden size in Malawi). In Malawi, however, a newer form of 
wealth appears to be more strongly associated with education: children in families which 
engage in income generating activities are substantially better educated than children in 
families without income generation.  
 
DISCUSSION  
Among two rural African populations we find clear evidence of biased parental investment in 
education according to child‘s birth order. In both populations, early born children are 
favored in terms of parental investment in education, at the expense of later born children. In 
line with Kaplan‘s model of the demographic transition (Kaplan 1996, Kaplan et al. 2002), 
where the shift from child quantity to child quality occurs first among the wealthy, we find 
biased allocation of education investment to be more evident in wealthier households. By 
investing heavily in a few elder offspring, wealthy parents seem to be attempting to provide 
them with a competitive advantage in the acquisition of both resources and mates. Poorer 
parents opt for a more opportunistic strategy of educational investment which does not 
discriminate between offspring. A similar ‗bet hedging‘ strategy in terms of education has 
been observed in a poor South African community, where parents divide educational 
investment equally across all their offspring (Liddell, Barrett, and Henzi 2003). The authors 
argue that living under uncertain conditions with high environmental risks, parents cannot 
predict which child will be successful, so educate all equally. Under conditions of improved 
resource availability and reduced environmental risk parents may become more 
discriminative. This may also explain why a negative effect of family size on schooling has 
become more pronounced in recent decades in Cameroon (Eloundou-Enyegu and Williams 
2006); and why, in a neighboring Ethiopian community, where a new development initiative 
has improved access to a clean water supply (and reduced extrinsic mortality risks), there has 
been an overall increase in investment in child education, but also greater inequality between 
siblings within the household (Gibson and Lawson submitted). 
 
Among both Arsi Oromo and Chewa, investment tradeoffs in rich families are largely 
resolved in favor of early born offspring. Sex also matters, however. Among the patrilineal 
Arsi Oromo, parents express the strongest overall preference for educating sons, who also 
inherit lineage titles, land and cattle. Sibling competition is also greatest among brothers, with 
later born sons losing out to their elder brothers for educational opportunities. Incremental 
reductions in land size and bridewealth payments with son order are also found among the 
Arsi Oromo (Gibson, in prep). Daughters, who leave the patrilineage (and village) upon 
marriage represent a drain on the patrilineage, are less likely to receive any education and 
represent little competition for their siblings.  
 
A different pattern emerges among the largely matrilocal/matrilineal Chewa, as daughters 
remain within the lineage at marriage and benefit from inheritable resources (Sear 2008). In 
this case, though daughters receive slightly less education than sons overall, elder daughters 
are prioritized for education. However, among the richest Chewa households, elder boys also 
gain privileged access to education. This mirrors the shift towards investment in sons in terms 
of inherited resources (land) in the wealthiest households, and is consistent with research in 
other populations suggesting accumulation in wealth results in a shift to patriliny (Holden and 
Mace 2003). These biases towards educating males may also occur because they are better 
able to capitalize on employment opportunities arising from an emerging skills-based 
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economy in the towns and cities in both countries (particularly construction and tourism 
industries). 
 
An overall early born advantage is something of a simplification for both societies. There is 
some evidence for a ‗middleborn disadvantage‘, as there is a curvilinear relationship between 
birth order and education attainment in Malawi, which may result from terminal investment 
in later born offspring, though again this effect is only seen in wealthy households. The 
analysis of sibling configuration suggests this effect may be driven by a beneficial effect of 
younger brothers, since having younger brothers is correlated with increased educational 
attainment. In Ethiopia, there is a similar trend indicating a positive effect of younger 
brothers in wealthy households. The mechanisms which bring this about are not clear, though 
it could simply reflect an unmeasured effect of wealth, as wealthier families may experience 
lower mortality among sons and/or produce more energetically expensive sons than poorer 
families. In support of this argument, previous research in this Ethiopian population has 
shown that mothers in better body condition produce a higher proportion of sons (Gibson and 
Mace, 2003). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Here we tested the impact of resources on parental investment decisions, by measuring 
sibling configuration effects on education in two African populations. We find that wealthier 
parents have more educated offspring, but that greater wealth also results in greater 
educational inequalities between children within the same family. This suggests that the 
spread of education and integration into a market- and skills-based economy is beginning to 
change the cost and benefit calculations of parents. In line with Kaplan‘s model of the 
demographic transition (Kaplan 1996, Kaplan et al. 2002) it appears to be the wealthier 
parents which are beginning to manipulate the educational attainment of their children most. 
There is also suggestive evidence from Malawi that parents who are most integrated into the 
new market economy are capitalizing most on educational opportunities for their children. 
These are both populations in which fertility is not yet being controlled substantially, and in 
both there remains a positive relationship between wealth and reproductive success typical of 
pre-transition societies (Gibson and Mace 2007, Holden, Sear, and Mace 2003). In the near 
future, these changing cost-benefit calculations of parents may lead to a reduction in family 
size, so parents can invest most intensively in a fewer children. 
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Table 1: Description of the study populations 
 
 ETHIOPIAN 
AGROPASTORALISTS 
(2003-2004) 
MALAWIAN 
HORTICULTURALISTS 
(1997) 
Total fertility rate 7.86 5.89 
Under 5 mortality 23.2% 12% 
Residence/ Inheritance Patrilocal/ Patrilineal Matrilocal/ Matrilineal 
Sample n % educated n 
Years of 
education 
mean±SD 
Overall 410 33.7% 1792 2.5±2.5  
Range 0-14 
Girls 201 33.5% 893 2.3±2.3 
Boys 209 33.8% 899 2.7±2.6 
Rich 257 35.8% 942 2.7±2.6 
Poor 151 29.8% 850 2.3±2.3 
Birth order: 
1 
2-4 
5-7 
8+ 
 
 
76 
177 
116 
33 
 
36.8% 
40.7% 
25% 
21.2% 
 
426 
866 
391 
109 
 
2.8±2.5 
2.5±2.5 
2.2±2.2 
2.5±2.7 
Mean age (yrs) 11.34±3.3 12.11±3.9 
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Table 2: Model 1: The effect of family size and birth order on measure of education  
 
 All Males Females 
 n Beta±SE p n Beta±SE p n Beta±SE p 
ETHIOPIA  
Sex (female) 
Birth order 
Birth order sq 
Family size 
Wealth (herd size) 
400  
-.741±.312 
-.259±.132 
.008±.027 
.118±.111 
.093±.054 
 
* 
* 
 
 
+ 
196  
 
-.382±.231 
-.006±.046 
.143±.187 
.232±.094 
 
 
+ 
 
 
* 
204  
 
-.252±.169 
.014±.038 
.158±.143 
-.050±.094 
 
 
Rich (>4 cattle) 
Sex (female) 
Birth order 
Family size 
 
253 
 
 
-.610±.386 
-.386±.162 
.187±.133 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
-.528±.286 
.115±.227 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
135 
 
 
 
-.376±.218 
.332±.178 
 
 
 
+
 
+
 
 
Poor (<=3 cattle) 
Sex (female) 
Birth order 
Family size 
 
147 
 
 
-1.19±.596 
.034±.259 
-.045±.237 
 
 
* 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
.076±.035 
.226±.452 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
 
 
-.036±.333 
-.428±.351 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MALAWI  
Sex (female) 
Birth order 
Birth order sq 
Family size 
Wealth(garden size) 
Wealth (income) 
1777  
-.205±.096 
-.461±.078 
.028±.007 
.091±.032 
-.004±.029 
1.281±.178 
 
* 
** 
** 
** 
 
** 
891  
 
-.534±.111 
.033±.010 
.094±.046 
.014±.042 
1.278±.244 
 
 
** 
** 
* 
 
** 
886  
 
-.403±.109 
.024±.010 
.091±.044 
-.025±.040 
1.290±.264 
 
 
** 
* 
* 
 
** 
 
Rich 
Sex (female) 
Birth order 
Birth order sq 
Family size 
 
933 
 
 
-.205±.135 
-.742±.104 
.043±.009 
.170±.044 
 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
482 
 
 
 
-.674±.142 
.039±.012 
.128±.060 
 
 
 
** 
** 
* 
 
451 
 
 
 
-.883±.158 
.053±.014 
.225±.065 
 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
Poor 
Sex (female) 
Birth order 
Birth order sq 
Family size 
 
844 
 
 
-.193±.135 
-.048±.121 
-.002±.012 
.019±.046 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
409 
 
 
 
-.286±.197 
.016±.020 
.043±.072 
 
 
 
 
 
 
435  
 
 
-.125±.147 
-.016±.015 
-.040±.059 
 
 
 
Notes: Controlling for age, age squared, sex and mother‘s age; 
+
<0.1, *<0.05, **<0.01  
 15 
Table 3: Model 2: Ethiopian education (ever educated) and sibling configuration by 
wealth group 
 
  All Males Females 
ETHIOPIA  n Beta±SE p n Beta±SE p n Beta±SE p 
Sex (female) 
Older brothers 
Young brothers 
Older sisters 
Young sisters 
400 -.716±.315 
-.326±.140 
.262±.146 
-.018±.137 
.030±.837 
* 
* 
+ 
 
 
196  
-.598±.238 
.352±.229 
-.074±.213 
-.054±.250 
 
*  
 
 
 
204  
-.160±.183 
.197±.203 
-.050±.189 
.114±.184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rich (>4 cattle) 
Sex (female) 
Older brothers 
Young brothers 
Older sisters 
Young sisters 
253  
-.632±.395 
-.435±.188 
.460±.196 
.004±.171 
.090±.176 
 
 
* 
* 
 
 
118  
 
-.827±.328 
.466±.307 
-.197±.273 
-.026±.314 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
135  
 
-.192±.232 
.523±.274 
.140±.236 
.220±.220 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
Poor(<=3 cattle) 
Sex (female) 
Older brothers 
Young brothers 
Older sisters 
Young sisters 
147  
-.989±.580 
-.155±.228 
.065±.259 
.064±.260 
-.060±.291 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
78  
 
-.155±.313 
.348±.445 
.416±.334 
.121±.521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69  
 
-.307±.399 
-.477±.418 
-.633±.430 
-.250±.399 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Logistic regression controlling for age, age squared, mother‘s age and wealth (herd 
size); 
+
<0.1, *<0.05.  
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Table 4: Model 2: Malawian education (years completed) and sibling configuration by 
wealth group 
 
 All Males Females 
MALAWI  n Beta±SE p n Beta±SE p n Beta±SE p 
Sex (female) 
Older brothers 
Young brothers 
Older sisters 
Young sisters 
1777 -.207±0.096 
-.051±.048 
.129±.0.49 
-.187±.045 
.066±.049 
* 
 
** 
** 
 
891  
-.082±.074 
.172±.072 
-.248±.066 
.029±.070 
 
 
* 
** 
 
886  
-.014±.063 
.101±.066 
-.126±.063 
.097±.068 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
Rich (>2 ha, 
income) 
Sex (female) 
Older brothers 
Young brothers 
Older sisters 
Young sisters 
 
933  
 
-.258±.139 
-.112±.065 
.257±.069 
-.231±.062 
.055±.069 
 
 
* 
* 
** 
** 
 
482  
 
 
-.188±.097 
.269±.094 
-.190±.089 
.035±.095 
 
 
 
* 
** 
* 
 
451  
 
 
-.060±.090 
.234±.102 
-.268±.087 
.091±.102 
 
 
 
 
* 
** 
 
Poor(<=2 ha) 
(Sex) female 
Older brothers 
Young brothers 
Older sisters 
Young sisters 
844  
-.199±.136 
.045±.074 
-.016±.072 
-.157±.070 
.050±.072 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
409  
 
.115±.115 
.151±.119 
-.377±.101 
.040±.109 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
435  
 
-.001±.093 
-.078±.087 
.058±.094 
.074±.093 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Linear regression controlling for age, age squared, mother‘s age and wealth (garden 
size and income-generating activities); 
+
<0.1, *<0.05, **<0.01 
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Figure legends 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Ethiopian male children receiving education by number of same 
sex elder siblings, data for rich and poor households  
 
 
Figure 2a: Mean years of education for Malawian male children by number of same sex 
elder siblings, data for rich and poor households 
 
 
Figure 2b: Mean years of education for Malawian female children by number of same 
sex elder siblings, data for rich and poor households  
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Figure 1: Percentage of Ethiopian male children receiving education by number of same 
sex elder siblings, data for rich and poor households  
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 19 
Figure 2a: Mean years of education for Malawian male children by number of same sex 
elder siblings, data for rich and poor households 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Mean years of education for Malawian female children by number of same 
sex elder siblings, data for rich and poor households  
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